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TAKING A PAGE FROM THE FDA’S PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE 
INFORMATION RULES: REIMAGINING ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
Rebecca Bratspies and Sarah Lamdan
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2017, Hurricanes Harvey and Irma hit the southern United 
States in rapid succession. These massive hurricanes wrought widespread 
devastationdestroying buildings, flooding neighborhoods, and taking 
lives.1 Harvey shattered the national rainfall record for a single storm, 
dropping more than fifty inches of rain in thirty-six hours.2 The rest of the 
country watched in shock as stranded Houstonians waded through chest-
deep floodwaters. Those residents were not merely wading through water; 
they were wading through a toxic stew. Those same floodwaters that filled 
the streets inundated scores of industrial facilities and at least thirteen of 
Houston’s forty-one Superfund sites.3 Floodwater carried contaminants and 
fugitive chemicals from those deluged Superfund sites into densely 
populated areas of the city. Indeed, hurricane floodwaters notoriously carry 
all manner of contaminants, from pesticides and landfill waste to the 
contents of inundated chemical waste storage containers.4 The problem is 
particularly severe in industry-heavy cities such as Houston, where 
floodwater travels from industrial stockyards and production plants through 
 
* Sarah Lamdan and Rebecca Bratspies are both Professors at CUNY School of Law. They 
collaborate through the Center for Urban Environmental Reform. 
 1. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria were especially intense and long-lasting due to 
climate change. Warm seas brought extraordinary amounts of rain that stalled over major 
municipalities in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Emily Schuckburgh et al., Hurricanes 
Harvey, Irma and Maria: How Natural Were These ‘Natural Disasters’?, 72 WEATHER 353, 
353 (2017) (“So in conclusion, it is clear that human activities have raised the risks of various 
aspects of hurricane damage.”). 
 2. Brian Resnick, Harvey Broke a National Rainfall Record for a Single Tropical 
Storm, VOX (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:33 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8 
/29/16221542/hurricane-harvey-rainfall-record-houston. 
 3. Status of Superfund Sites in Areas Affected by Harvey, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/status-superfund-sites-areas-
affected-harvey (describing sites designated for cleanup under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a federal law that 
tasks polluters with paying to clean up the sites they pollute). 
 4. Alexandra Sifferlin, Here’s How Dirty Flood Water Really Is, TIME (Aug. 29, 2017, 
10:14 AM), http://time.com/4919355/can-flood-water-make-you-sick/ (describing the 
network of waterways that exacerbate Houston’s floods). 
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the bayous, channels, and temporary waterways, leaving toxic water and 
other chemical hazards in its wake.5 
The Texan first responders dispatched to the flooded Arkema chemical 
plant in Crosby, Texas found this out first-hand. The Arkema plant 
manufactures organic peroxides used in plastics and rubbers.6 During 
Hurricane Harvey, water flooded the plant’s backup generators, cutting off 
power to the refrigeration system that kept the plant’s chemicals at a safe, 
non-flammable temperature.7 Without refrigeration, the chemicals exploded, 
sending forty-foot plumes of toxic chemicals into the air and floodwaters.8 
First responders rushing to deal with the crisis faced thick, toxic fumes.9 
Unfortunately, those first responders were not armed with critical 
knowledge about the likely composition of those fumes.10 Many collapsed.11 
Police officers and medical personnel were “doubled over vomiting, unable 
to breathe.”12 
Deliberate choices to hide chemical hazard data sent these first 
responders into harm’s way unprepared.13 In 2014, flouting national disaster 
preparedness laws Texas’s then-Attorney General, Greg Abbott,14 restricted 
access to Arkema’s chemical records citing potential “terroristic 
activities.”15 This decision made the records detailing the toxic chemicals 
 
 5. Tom Dart, ‘The Bayou’s Alive’: Ignoring It Could Kill Houston, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
20, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/20/bayou-houston-flood-
hurricane-harvey-texas-resilience; Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, Harvey’s Flooding Spurs 
Concerns About Houston’s Toxic Waste Sites, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/29/houstons-flood-threatens-turn-polluted-superfund-
sites-toxic-gumbo/. 
 6. Shelby Lin Erdman, What Is the Arkema Plant and What Do They Make?, ATLANTA 
J. CONST. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/weather/hurricanes/what-the-arkema-plant-
and-what-they-make/M28F4CrhRY9hk0JdRffuhJ/. 
 7. Ari Natter & Laura Brubaker Calkins, Harvey Responders Say They Were Sickened 
by Chemical Plant Blaze, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.journalnow.com 
/news/nation_world/harvey-responders-say-they-were-sickened-by-chemical-plant-
blaze/article_e28bc1aa-33dc-5e30-ba58-026545104cb3.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7. 
 14. Greg Abbott was elected governor of Texas in 2014, and he was overwhelmingly re-
elected in November 2018. Brett Samuels, Texas Governor Greg Abbott Wins Reelection, 
HILL (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:10 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/414274-texas-
governor-wins-re-election. 
 15. Emma Platoff & Jim Malewitz, Crosby Plant Explosion Highlights State Efforts to 
Block Access to Chemical Information, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www 
.texastribune.org/2017/09/01/crosby-plant-explosion-highlights-state-efforts-limit-access-
informati/. 
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stored and used in the Arkema plant almost impossible to access. As a 
result, the Arkema first responders were hampered by a lack of knowledge 
about the hazards they faced as they struggled to contain dangerous 
chemical fires.16 
The Arkema disaster highlights the importance of access to chemical 
data when natural disasters strike. Lack of information put the Arkema first 
responders in jeopardy.17 Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident.18 
Hazardous chemical releases have injured thousands of people across the 
country.19 An explosion at the Bayer Crop Science plant in Institute, West 
Virginia killed two employees and injured eight others,20 and a pipe failure 
at a Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California sent 15,000 people to the 
hospital.21 Overall, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (CSB), which investigates chemical accidents to protect workers, has 
responded to more than 800 chemical release incidents since 1998.22 As 
climate change-supercharged natural disasters threaten industrial 
infrastructure with high winds, flood waters, intense heat, wildfire, and 
mudslides, chemical hazards are far more likely.23 Ordinary safety 
mechanisms often fail in extraordinary weather conditions.24 Temperature 
and pressure controls that prevent chemical explosions, as well as structures 
 
 16. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7. 
 17. See, e.g., id. 
 18. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT: 
PESTICIDE CHEMICAL RUNAWAY REACTION PRESSURE VESSEL EXPLOSION 1 (2011), https:// 
www.csb.gov/bayer-cropscience-pesticide-waste-tank-explosion/ (follow “FINAL REPORT: 
Bayer CropScience” hyperlink). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL., IMPROVING PUBLIC AND WORKER SAFETY AT OIL 
REFINERIES 4 (2014), http://www.caloes.ca.gov/FireRescueSite/Documents/Refinery%20Rpt 
%20Feb%202014.pdf. 
 22. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., https://www.csb.gov/ (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 23. Adam B. Smith, 2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: A 
Historic Year in Context, CLIMATE (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/news-
features/blogs /beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historic-
year (discussing and providing statistics demonstrating the increasing climate and weather 
events). 
 24. The Arkema plant is a prime example of this issue. Upon investigation, the CSB 
found that there were no design flaws in the plant that caused the chemical breakdown and 
explosions, but the site’s hurricane plan only prepared for up to two feet of flooding, rather 
than the four feet that flooded the plant during Hurricane Harvey. Jen Para, Report: Arkema 
Crosby Plant Warned of Flood Risk Before Harvey, HOUS. BUS. J. (May 24, 2018, 2:10 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2018/05/24/report-arkema-crosby-plant-warned-
of-flood-risk.html. 
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such as retaining walls and containers, are often not built to withstand 
extreme weather.25 
One clear lesson that emerged from the post-mortem analysis of 
emergency response during Hurricane Katrina was that arming the public 
and first responders with adequate risk information is an imperative of 
effective emergency preparation and response.26 Indeed, information access 
is a cornerstone of effective chemical disaster preparation.27 When 
hurricanes, mudslides, and wildfires rip through cities and towns, 
information about the chemical hazards lurking in water-inundated storage 
facilities, broken refrigeration units, and plants with crippled infrastructures 
becomes critical to protecting human health and safety.28 The more people 
know about the risks at hand, the more efficiently localities and individuals 
can react to chemical hazards. For this reason, disaster preparation laws, 
such as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) and the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program (RMP), 
contain information access provisions designed to prepare first responders 
and communities for chemical catastrophes.29 
Yet, federal, state, and local governments too often fail to ensure that 
first responders, localities, and individuals have the information they need to 
prepare for chemical disasters. Policies designed to protect trade secrets and 
react to national security issues sometimes curb information access.30 Since 
September 11, 2001, information about chemical hazards in the U.S. has 
been increasingly difficult to access.31 Commercial and national security 
interests have undercut information access requirements enshrined in 
EPCRA and the RMP.32 What’s more, those information access 
requirements have not been properly maintained and enforced.33 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: 
LESSONS LEARNED 61–62 (2006) (discussing the more than 2,000 cases of pollution reported 
in the wake of the hurricane and concluding that better information access would have led to 
better preparation and response to the environmental threats caused by the hurricane), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/. 
 27. Nitesh Bharosa et al., Challenges and Obstacles in Sharing and Coordinating 
Information During Multi-Agency Disaster Response: Propositions from Field Exercises, 12 
INFO. SYSTEMS FRONTIERS 49, 4950 (2010) (“Access to core information enhances the 
efficiency and effectiveness of [disaster] responses as well as coordination throughout the 
network of responding organizations.”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 301, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1100150 (2014); Clean Air Act Risk Management Program, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2018). 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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As we contend with natural disasters exacerbated by climate change, 
we will need to redesign critical infrastructure to protect vulnerable 
communities. We must also ensure that those communities have access to 
the critical information they need for emergency preparedness and 
emergency response. That means redesigning our intangible information 
infrastructure as well. 
This article proposes a partial solution to this information access crisis. 
It begins with an analysis of the increased chemical disaster risks posed by 
climate change-related extreme weather.34 After laying this foundation about 
the relationship between chemical disaster risk and climate change, Part III 
provides an overview of the current state of federal law governing disclosure 
of chemical disaster risks.35 Part IV identifies the key concerns that have 
been deployed by those bent on thwarting or reducing public access to 
chemical risk information: national security and confidential business 
information.36 This section makes the case that EPCRA and the RMP, even 
if fully enforced, fail to equip communities adequately for the unique 
challenges posed by disaster-related chemical releases.37 Part V of the paper 
suggests using the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) information 
access model to inform the public about chemical hazards that pose risks in 
extreme weather events.38 The FDA has successfully created a system to 
notify the public about drug safety issues while protecting trade secrets. A 
chemical hazard notification system modeled on the FDA paradigm could 
similarly inform the public while preserving sensitive trade and national 
security information.39 
To prevent jeopardizing health and safety in the wake of a natural 
disaster, people need quick and easy access to information about potential 
chemical risks.40 In regulating drug and medical device risks, the FDA has 
perfected modes for streamlined, easy-to-understand risk communication, 
using tools such as labels and inserts.41 This article proposes it as a model 
 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See infra Part V. 
 39. See infra Part VI. 
 40. See infra Part III. 
 41. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2018) (describing how prescription drug labels must be 
formatted, and what they must contain). FDA administrators identify several synonyms used 
for drug labels that also include several different forms of labeling, including: prescribing 
information, package insert, professional labeling, direction circular, and package circular. 
Mary E. Kremzner & Steven F. Osborne, An Introduction to the Improved FDA Prescription 
Drug Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training/ 
forhealth professionals/ucm090796.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
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that could fruitfully be adapted to more effectively communicate chemical 
risk information.42 
II. THE INCREASED RISKS OF EXTREME WEATHER POSED BY CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
The 2017 hurricane season was intense and relentless. Seventeen 
named storms and ten hurricanes, six of them major,43 formed in the seventh 
most active hurricane season in the historical record dating to 1851.44 Seven 
storms hit the United States, and three of them caused devastating damage.45 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) called the 
2017 hurricane season “Extremely Active” and the NOAA administrator 
called it “a hurricane season that wouldn’t quit.”46 These storms made the 
2017 hurricane season the most expensive in U.S. history, causing more 
than $200 billion of damage across the nation.47 The devastation caused by 
the hurricanes was greater than in past storms because of the especially 
powerful winds and intense rainfall, which scientists blamed on warmer 
ocean waters.48 While the number of weather disasters in 2017 was extreme, 
it was part of a trend. The frequency of weather-related disasters has 
increased forty-six percent since 2000.49 Between 2005 and 2014, climate-
related disasters cost $309 billion in G-20 countries alone.50 
Scientists predict that, as climate change progresses, weather events 
once thought of as extreme, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and 
 
 42. See infra Part VI. 
 43. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) defines a “major 
hurricane” as one that reaches maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of at least 50 m/s 
(96 kt, 111 mph). Thus, a major hurricane would rank as a 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson 
scale. Frequently Asked Questions, What is a major hurricane?, NOAA, HURRICANE RES. 
DIVISION, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A3.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 44. Extremely Active 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Finally Ends, NOAA (Nov. 30, 
2017), http://www.noaa.gov/media-release/extremely-active-2017-atlantic-hurricane-season-
finally-ends. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Willie Drye, 2017 Hurricane Season Was the Most Expensive in U.S. History, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/2017-hurricane-
season-most-expensive-us-history-spd/. 
 48. Frequently Asked Questions, How might global warming change hurricane intensity, 
frequency, and rainfall?, NOAA, HURRICANE RES. DIVISION, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd 
/tcfaq/G3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 49. Nick Watts et al., The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change: From 25 
Years of Inaction to a Global Transformation for Public Health, 391 LANCET 581, 581 
(2017). 
 50. Elena Holodny, Extreme Weather Events Are on the Rise, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 
2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/extreme-weather-events-increasing-
2016-3. 
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Maria, will become more common.51 Houston, for example, has weathered 
three 500-year storms in the past three years.52 This trend is expected to 
continue.53 All evidence suggests that as the climate changes, severe storms 
will be larger and longer-lasting, forest fires will be more frequent, and 
high-impact weather-related events such as droughts and heat waves will be 
more common and severer.54 
Because extreme weather events dramatically increase the chances of 
structural or operational failures at industrial sites, they make chemical 
disasters far more likely.55 The chemical disasters sparked by Hurricane 
Harvey are a foretaste of what we can expect going forward.56 More than 
forty industrial sites, including refineries and plastics plants, released 
dangerous amounts of hazardous pollutants into the air after Hurricane 
Harvey.57 Air emissions exceeded state limits while at least fourteen toxic 
waste sites experienced flooding or damage, releasing hazardous 
chemicals.58 The flooded sites included the San Jacinto River Waste Pits, a 
Superfund site that contains carcinogenic paper mill waste.59 The deluge of 
rain from Harvey damaged the Waste Pits protective cap designed to contain 
the waste, spreading dioxins and other toxic chemicals far and wide.60 After 
 
 51. See generally James P. Kossin et al., Extreme Storms, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL 
REPORT: A SUSTAINED ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY OF THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, 375 (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017), https://assets.documentcloud 
.org/documents/3920195/Final-Draft-of-the-Climate-Science-Special-Report.pdf. 
 52. Christopher Ingraham, Houston Is Experiencing Its Third ‘500 Year’ Flood in Three 
Years. How Is That Possible?, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 29, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/29/houston-is-experiencing-its-third-500-
year-flood-in-3-years-how-is-that-possible/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.64 aaba2522a1. 
 53. See Kossin et al., supra note 51. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Nushin Huq, Chemical Plants Face New Reality in Natural Disaster Preparation, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-
energy/chemical-plants-face-new-reality-in-natural-disaster-preparation. 
 56. Hiroko Tabuchi et al., Floods Are Getting Worse, and 2,500 Chemical Sites Lie in 
the Water’s Path, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018 
/02/06/climate/flood-toxic-chemicals.html. 
 57. Troy Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of 
Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/09/08/us/houston-hurricane-harvey-harzardous-chemicals.html. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Lise Olsen & Brooke A. Lewis, EPA: Dioxin Leaking from Waste Pits, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/Houston 
/article/EPA-Dioxin-leaking-from-Waste-Pits-12242409.php. 
 60. Jack Healy & Sheila Kaplan, Harvey Swept Hazardous Mercury Ashore. The 
Mystery: Its Source, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06 
/science /harvey-superfund-mercury.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fscience; 
San Jacinto River Waste Pits Superfund Site, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www 
.epa.gov/tx/sjrwp (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
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experiencing damage from the hurricane, Houston’s Valero Energy refinery 
released dangerous levels of the carcinogen benzene into the air.61 
The problem of toxic chemical releases in the wake of natural disasters 
is not unique to Hurricane Harvey. For instance, in 2012, Hurricane Sandy 
hit 247 Superfund sites, and one of them, the Gowanus Canal, overflowed 
into people’s homes.62 Similarly, scientists found toxic chemicals in the soil 
and groundwater affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.63 
Adequate preparation for a future of extreme weather events requires 
more and better preparation for industrial disasters. This need is 
compounded as the nation’s infrastructure ages, and repairs and upgrades 
are repeatedly postponed.64 First responders and the public at large must be 
able to anticipate the health and safety hazards posed by local industrial sites 
associated with natural disasters.65 Laws such as EPCRA and the RMP are 
meant to generate information about potential air emission risks posed by 
local industries and make that information available to first responders and 
the public.66 However, these laws are designed to aggregate general 
information about industrial plants, and are not specifically tailored to the 
enhanced risks created by extreme weather risks associated with climate 
change.67 Both laws suffer procedural and logistical deficiencies that leave 
 
 61. Hiroko Tabuchi, High Levels of Carcinogen Found in Houston Area After Harvey, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/us/harvey-houston-valero-
benzene.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0. 
 62. Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 
8, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144737/america-toxic-waste-hurricane-problem. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Eric Jaffe, America’s Infrastructure Crisis Is Really a Maintenance Crisis, CITYLAB 
(Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/02/americas-infrastructure-crisis-is-
really-a-maintenance-crisis/385452/. 
 65. Looking at collections of CSB’s incident reports reveals that many chemical 
disasters in the U.S. are caused in whole or in part by outdated, outmoded, and overburdened 
industrial infrastructure. See CSB Issues Case Study of Formosa Plastics Point Comfort, 
Texas, Fire and Explosions: Unprotected Piping, Non-Fire-proofed Structures, Lack of 
Automatic Shutoff Valves Noted as Causes; Flame-Resistant Clothing Recommend, U.S. 
CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD. (July 20, 2006), http://www.csb.gov/csb-
issues-case-study-of-formosa-plastics-point-comfort-texas-fire-and-explosions-unprotected-
piping-non-fireproofed-structures-lack-of-automatic-shutoff-valves-noted-as-causes-flame-
resistant-clothing-recommended/; U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., 
INVESTIGATION REPORT: REFINERY FIRE AND EXPLOSION (2007), https://www.csb.gov/bp-
america-refinery-explosion/ (follow “FINAL REPORT: Final Investigation Report” 
hyperlink); see also Griggs et al., supra note 57 (noting that many of the plants overcome by 
Hurricane Harvey have spotty safety records and noted safety issues). 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESOURCES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST 
RESPONDERS (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/epa-cfats-law-
enforcement-first-responder-resources-fs-508.pdf. 
 67. Congress enacted EPCRA enacted in 1986 in order to increase public knowledge 
and access to information on the chemicals at individual facilities, as well as to inform the 
public about chemical uses and potential releases into the environment. U.S. ENVTL. 
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the public and first responders ill-equipped to respond to post-natural 
disaster chemical catastrophes. 
III. EPCRA & RMP: THE CURRENT CHEMICAL RISK INFORMATION REGIME 
Information access provisions are codified in most environmental laws 
and programs as well as other federal and state health and safety provisions. 
Provisions such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) oil 
pollution prevention regulations,68 the U.S. Department of Transportation’s 
Pipeline Response Plan regulation,69 and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) chemical facility anti-terrorism standards,70 regulate the 
collection of chemical hazard data. However, only two major provisions, 
EPCRA and RMP, are specifically designed to prepare the public for 
chemical disasters.71 Just as housing codes are “written in blood”72 these 
emergency disaster laws were reactions to past emergency preparedness 
failures. Specifically, EPCRA and RMP emerged in response to two Union 
Carbide chemical disasters: one in Bhopal, India and another in Institute, 
West Virginia.73 In 1984, faulty operations at a Union Carbide pesticide 
 
PROTECTION AGENCY, THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT 1 
(2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/epcra_fact_sheet 
_overview_8-2-17.pdf . See infra notes 57−61 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the 
catastrophe that prompted this law. 
 68. EPA Oil Pollution Prevention, 40 C.F.R. § 112.7 (2016). 
 69. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration Pipeline Safety, 49 C.F.R. §§ 190–99 (2017). 
 70. DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 6 C.F.R. § 27 (2007). 
 71. Although both the Clean Air Act’s RMP and EPCRA have information reporting 
and dissemination requirements, EPCRA’s are distinct from those in the Clean Air Act. The 
hazardous chemical reporting requirements under EPCRA differ from the Clean Air Act. 
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 370 (2018), with id. § 68. EPCRA hazardous chemical inventory 
reporting (on Program 1 or Program 2 forms) applies to all hazardous chemicals, as defined 
by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), with certain exemptions. Id. § 
370.13. Information reported under the hazardous chemical inventory regulations includes the 
types and amounts of hazardous chemicals, location and storage information, and facility 
contact information. The Clean Air Act’s RMP applies to a distinct set of regulated 
substances. Id. § 68.130. The RMP requirements go beyond emergency planning and 
reporting; they require a holistic approach to accident prevention and mitigation. Elements 
required under the RMP regulations vary for individual stationary sources, but generally 
include a hazard assessment, a prevention program, an emergency response program, and a 
management system. Id. § 68. There is also the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard 
(PSM), but it focuses on providing information for accident prevention to workers, not the 
general public, so it will not be a focus in this article. Id. § 68(D). 
 72. See, e.g., Daniel Byrne, After 100 Years: The Lessons to Be Learned from Triangle 
Shirtwaist, FIREHOUSE (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.firehouse.com/prevention-investigation 
/article/10463244/triangle-shirtwaist-fire-lessons-in-fire-codes-and-prevention. 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
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manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India led to a massive explosion.74 More 
than half a million people were exposed to toxic airborne chemicals, tens of 
thousands died or suffered severe injuries.75 Less than a year later, a storage 
tank exploded at another Union Carbide plant, this one in Institute, West 
Virginia.76 The resulting toxic cloud injured scores of nearby residents.77 
Residents in both Bhopal and Institute were caught unaware and 
unprepared.78 First responders faced added dangers because they lacked 
knowledge about the chemical substances at issue, and thus could not take 
appropriate protective measures.79 Doctors treating the injured had no idea 
what symptoms to expect, or what treatments would be effective.80 These 
chemical disasters became human disasters, and lack of information 
magnified the harms.81 
In November 1986, less than two years after the Bhopal disaster, 
Congress enacted EPCRA to respond to the need for accurate, timely 
information about chemical risks.82 The RMP Rule was promulgated to 
implement 112(r) of the Clean Air Act several years later, in 1990.83 Both 
statutes included sweeping public information access provisions. Through 
these provisions, EPCRA and RMP sought to transform industrial chemical 
practices “from a secretive alchemy to a publicly posted overload of papers, 
training materials and neighborhood emergency maps.”84 The resulting 
statutory and regulatory schemes provided for information disclosure to 
make public the chemical hazard data needed to improve awareness, 
planning, and preparation for potential disasters. 
 
 74. Tim Edwards, What Happened, THE BHOPAL MED. APPEAL, http://bhopal.org/what-
happened/ (last visited May 9, 2017). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ben A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks at Carbide Plant in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plant-
in-west-virginia.html. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; Edwards, supra note 74. 
 79. Edwards, supra note 74. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also, H.R. REP. NO. 
99962, at 28081 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3374. 
 83. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7), 61 Fed. Reg. 31668 (June 20, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 68). 
 84. James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil:” Should 
Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 559, 563 (2002). 
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A. EPCRA 
EPCRA was a 1986 amendment to the Comprehensive Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (commonly known as “Superfund”). 85 It 
was introduced as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (SARA).86 EPCRA governs local and state emergency planning for 
potential disasters involving hazardous chemicals, the right of the public to 
access information on chemical hazards in their community, and the 
reporting responsibilities for facilities that use, store, and release hazardous 
chemicals.87 The law has four major provisions: emergency planning 
obligations;88 emergency release notifications;89 reporting requirements for 
hazardous chemical storage;90 and the creation of a toxic chemical release 
inventory.91
 
These provisions are markedly different from more traditional 
“command and control”, “end of pipe” governance that limit hazardous 
discharge. Instead, EPCRA uses regulation to proactively promote chemical 
disaster awareness and preparation.92 The theory behind EPCRA is that 
public access to data helps communities make informed decisions about the 
chemical hazards in their midst. The law prioritizes public participation 
(hence the “right-to-know” language in its title).93 Indeed, EPCRA is the 
only U.S. environmental law that arguably creates a stand-alone right of 
environmental information access.94 
EPCRA mandates the public availability of two major types of 
information: (1) emergency plans and (2) information about toxic releases.95 
While that sweep might be broad, the law’s focus is fairly narrow. EPCRA 
 
 85. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99499. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kevin J. Finto, Regulation by Information Through EPCRA, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 13 (1990). 
 88. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act §§ 301–303. 
 89. Id. § 304. 
 90. Id. §§ 311–312. 
 91. Id. § 313. 
 92. Matthew J. Smith, “Thou Shalt Not Violate!”: Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act Authorizes Citizen Suits for Wholly Past Violations – Atlantic States Legal 
Foundation v. Whiting Roll Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1051, 
1075 (1993). 
 93. At the state and local levels, stakeholders help make EPCRA-required chemical 
emergency plans. Local Emergency Planning Committees, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (last visited Nov. 
12, 2018). 
 94. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 301, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1100150 (2014). 
 95. SARAH LAMDAN, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: RESEARCH, ACCESS, & 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 88 (2017). 
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mandates access to information that is likely to help reduce acute health 
effects from short-term exposure to chemical releases. In other words, 
EPCRA covers precisely the type of information that is key to ensuring the 
safety of civilians and first responders facing hurricanes, wildfires, flooding 
and other climate change-related weather events. 
The most well-known information access provision in EPCRA is the 
one that requires the EPA to create and maintain an inventory of toxic 
chemicals, or Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).96 The TRI has been credited 
with reducing chemical emissions in the United States by twenty-one 
percent since 2006.97 While these reductions are highly significant, the TRI 
has also produced a less concrete but equally important outcome in the 
context of information policy, “serv[ing] as a constant example of the vital 
role information plays in a democracy, and the importance of the public’s 
right to know.”98 
Beyond the TRI, which reports on past releases, EPCRA also helps 
communities plan for future emissions by providing information to the 
public through Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).99 LEPCs 
are composed of local participants including elected officials; police, fire, 
civil defense, and public health professionals; environmental, transportation, 
and hospital officials; facility representatives; members of the media; and 
community groups who develop and review local emergency response plans 
and disseminate disaster preparation information to the public.100 LEPC 
emergency response plans generally contain information such as: 
identification of facilities and transportation routes for extremely hazardous 
substances; description of on-site and off-site emergency response 
procedures; emergency notification procedures; predictions about areas and 
populations that may be affected by a hazardous substances event and 
evacuation plans; description of local emergency equipment and facilities 
and the persons responsible for them; training programs for emergency 
responders; and methods and schedules for exercising emergency response 
plans.101 Ideally, LEPCs are hubs for chemical hazard information. If 
properly maintained and operated, LEPCs provide information about local 
 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
 97. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI) NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents 
/2016_tri_national_analysis_execsumm.pdf. 
 98. OMB WATCH, DISMANTLING THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY’S SYSTEMATIC WEAKENING OF THE TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (2005), 
research.policyarchive.org/5087.pdf. 
 99. Local Emergency Planning Committees, supra note 93. 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 11001(a). 
 101. Local Emergency Planning Committees, supra note 93. 
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chemical hazards for people wanting to learn more about how they can 
prepare for chemical disasters nearby. 
State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) oversee LEPCs.102 
SERC members are designated by state governors, and SERCs coordinate 
LEPC activities, including establishing procedures for how LEPCs receive 
and process public requests for information collected and created under 
EPCRA.103 SERC members usually include emergency management experts 
and administrators, as well as firefighting and water quality experts.104 
B. Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Plans 
EPCRA is not the only federal statute dealing with public access to 
environmental information. Section 7412(r) of the Clean Air Act required 
the EPA to draft regulations and guidance to prevent chemical accidents at 
facilities that use, distribute, and process hazardous chemicals that pose the 
greatest risk of harm in accidental airborne releases of toxic or flammable 
gas.105 These statutory requirements were added to the Clean Air Act in 
1990.106 It took the EPA nearly a decade to create a risk management plan 
program and to finalize the implementing regulations. In 1999, the EPA 
finally published the Risk Management Plan regulations under Section 
112(r).107 The RMP was designed to help local citizens and emergency 
response personnel plan for chemical accidents.108 
The EPA created three RMP programs for RMP reporting facilities.109 
These tiers “progressively gain granularity and rigor” to address the 
particular scales of risks and needs at different facilities.110 Program 1 
applies a limited set of requirements to facilities perceived to pose less risk 
(typically those facilities with processes unlikely to affect the public even in 
the worst case chemical release scenario, and that have not had a major 
accident in the last five years).111 On the other end of the spectrum, Program 
 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 11044. 
 103. Id. 
 104. State Emergency Response Commissions Contacts, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/state-emergency-response-commissions-contacts (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2017). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2014). 
 106. Id. 
 107. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 112(r): ACCIDENTAL RELEASE 
PREVENTION / RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN RULE (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production 
/files/2013-10/documents/caa112_rmp_factsheet.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595 (proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
68). 
 111. 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(b); id. § 68.12. 
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3 applies to facilities that are subject to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard or 
classified in an especially hazardous North American Industrial 
Classification System code.112 These facilities pose a greater risk to the 
public in chemical emergencies. Program 3 requirements include more 
extensive procedures and reviews for operating equipment, management, 
employees, and contractors.113 Program 2 facilities are in the middle—
neither eligible for Program 1 status nor falling under one of the Program 3 
categories. These facilities are subject to more robust requirements than 
Program 1, but less than those applied to Program 3.114 
Under the finalized RMP regulations, 15,000 facilities were subject to 
RMP requirements, which include the creation of hazard assessments that 
detail the potential effects of accidental releases, accident summaries, and 
evaluations of worst-case and alternative accidental release scenarios called 
“offsite consequence analysis” (OCA).115 By 2008, the EPA collected risk 
management plans from about 14,000 facilities.116 
These plans are supposed to be accessible to the public.117 They are 
held at federal reading rooms located throughout the fifty states, and may 
also be available through local LEPC offices.118 The EPA website also 
suggests that interested individuals may file Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests to see RMP materials.119 As another access point, the EPA 
 
 112. Id. § 68(D). 
 113. Id. Processes that are subject to OSHA’s Process Safety Management standards or 
that fall under certain NAICS codes. These processes include especially hazardous industries 
such as petroleum refineries, petrochemical and chlorine manufacturing, and pesticide 
manufacturing. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
GUIDANCE 13 (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/chap-
02-final.pdf. 
 114. 40 C.F.R. § 68(C). 
 115. Id. § 68.25–.33. 
 116. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 107. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c). 
 118. However, after 9/11, this access was curbed in the interest of national security. 
Jessica Barkas, Nuking Freedom of Information and Community Right to Know: How Post-
9/11 Secrecy Could Make America Less Safe, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POLICY J. 199, 207 
(2005). Now, OCAs are generally only available in state reading rooms. 40 C.F.R. § 1400.3. 
The EPA was creating a system to balance national security interests with public access that 
would require facility owners and operators to notify the public that certain information is 
available upon request. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management 
Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (proposed Mar. 14, 2016). However, 
this measure has been put on hold by the Trump administration. 82 Fed. Reg. 27133 (June 14, 
2017). 
 119. Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request Process to Get Information 
About Risk Management Plans, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
rmp/using-freedom-information-act-foia-request-process-get-information-about-risk-
management-plans (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). 
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has also created an e-mail system for seeing whether someone is in a 
“vulnerable zone” that could be affected by a chemical accident, according 
to an RMP submitted to the agency.120 However, this e-mail system does not 
seem significantly different than the general FOIA process, requiring 
requesters to fill out an online form and then wait for an e-mail response 
containing the applicable records, with no guarantee on the timing or 
completeness of the agency’s response.121 
Although these laws were drafted to prevent chemical disaster-related 
injuries, natural disasters pose a specialized type of chemical disaster threat. 
After major storms and natural disasters, communities must deal with a 
laundry list of competing health and safety issues. Rapid access to 
information about chemical storage and use during this period is vital for 
protecting the health and safety of entire communities. Comprehensive and 
effective disclosure is vital to keep the public and first responders informed 
during disaster-related emergencies. Chemical hazard disclosure laws need 
to adapt to meet the reality that climate-related disasters are on the rise. 
IV. INFORMATION ACCESS BREAKDOWNS: PROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT 
ACCESS SYSTEMS 
Despite their gaps and flaws, EPCRA and the RMP could form the 
foundation of a well-crafted information disclosure system. Unfortunately, 
both programs are plagued with implementation issues on local, state, and 
federal levels. EPCRA and RMP-mandated programs are typically low 
priorities, thinly staffed with small budgets.122 Violations often go 
 
 120. Vulnerable Zone Indicator System, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/vulnerable-zone-indicator-system (last visited Jan. 19, 2017) 
(accessible plans based on specific site locations). 
 121. Id. 
 122. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SPECIAL REPORT: 
RISK MANAGEMENT PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR FIRE 
SERVICE PLANNING 10−11 (2003), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-
124.pdf (describing LEPCs and first responder organizations as generally understaffed and 
underfunded, with many volunteers doing the bulk of the work). Many state LEPCs are 
underfunded and understaffed, comprised of mostly volunteers. See, e.g., Erica M. Matheny, 
A Survey of the Structural Determinants of Local Emergency Planning Committee 
Compliance and Proactivity; Toward an Applied Theory of Precaution in Emergency 
Management, ETD ARCHIVE 88−90, 112−113 (2012), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio 
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=etdarchive (documenting this phenomenon 
in Ohio); Rosemary O’Leary, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act: 
Ten Public Management Challenges for State and Local Governments, PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & 
MGMT. REV. 293, 300−01 (1995) (identifying funding as a key hurdle for implementation); 
Danielle M. Purifoy, EPCRA: A Retrospective on the Environmental Right-to-Know Act, 13 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 375, 399, 410 (2013) (documenting lack of funding in 
West Virginia). 
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unchecked, and fines for noncompliance are light and sparsely enforced. 
Worse, many states actively restrict access to the chemical data that EPCRA 
was designed to make public, citing fears about unintended uses of the 
information to promote terrorism or interfere with trade secrets.123 
The Harvey first responders sickened at Arkema were put in jeopardy 
by precisely these failures in the information infrastructure.124 Texas’s then-
Attorney General, Greg Abbott used national security concerns as a 
justification for limiting the availability of EPCRA Program 2 inventories.125 
This failure to properly implement EPCRA and RMP provisions left first 
responders unprepared for the toxic chemical exposure they faced. This 
unfortunate situation recurs with some regularity.126 Reports issued by the 
CSB in the wake of disasters are replete with instances of first responders 
suffering illnesses and burns while responding to industrial accidents 
because they did not have the necessary information to adequately prepare 
for chemical hazards.127 Similarly, 9/11 first responders also suffered from 
exposure to a toxic dust filled with thousands of contaminants including 
cement dust, lead, and mercury.128 A significant percentage of those 
responders have fallen ill or died.129 
It is not just first responders who are at risk. Despite the information 
access provisions in EPCRA and the Clean Air Act, residents often do not 
know about impending chemical disasters until they see chemical clouds or 
 
 123. Section 322 of EPCRA allows a facility to withhold the specific chemical identity 
information of an extremely hazardous substance from its EPRCA reporting if the facility 
asserts a trade secret for that chemical identity. 40 Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 322, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100150 (2018). 
 124. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7. 
 125. Lauren McGaughy, State Blocks Release of Chemical Facility Information, HOUS. 
CHRON. (June 13, 2014, 8:05 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics 
/texas/article/State-blocks-release-of-chemical-facility-5551690.php (describing Abbott’s 
decision to treat Tier II reports as classified). 
 126. Settlement Reached in West, Texas, Fertilizer Plant Explosion, INS. J. (Jan. 17, 
2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2018/01/17/477424.htm. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Morton Lippmann et al., Health Effects of World Trade Center (WTC) Dust: An 
Unprecedented Disaster with Inadequate Risk Management, 45 CRITICAL REVS. IN 
TOXICOLOGY 492 (2015); Julian Gavaghan, Still Dying from 9/11: Toxic Legacy of World 
Trade Center Attack Revealed as Dust Increases Risk of Cancer by a Fifth, DAILY MAIL 
(Sept. 2, 2011, 8:45 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2032893/Firefighters-
attended-9-11-scene-19-likely-develop-cancer.html; Leah McGrath Goodman, 9/11’s Second 
Wave: Cancer and Other Diseases Linked to the 2001 Attacks Are Surging, NEWSWEEK, 
(Sept. 7, 2016, 6:40 AM) 
https://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/16/9-11-death-toll-rising-496214.html. 
 129. NEVER FORGET PROJECT, STATISTICS FROM 9/11 AND 15 YEARS LATER, http:// 
neverforgetproject.com/statistics/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). 
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smell chemical odors after leaks and spills have already occurred.130 By 
then, it is often too late to adequately prepare for chemical exposure risks. In 
its chemical incident reviews, the CSB has documented communities 
unaware of chemical hazards or what to do when chemical leaks occur, 
despite the presence of RMPs.131 For instance, when there was a chemical 
explosion at a Chevron refinery in Richmond, California in 2012, people in 
surrounding communities saw black clouds, but they did not know what to 
do when they heard sirens.132 Unaware that they were supposed to shelter-in-
place, citizens panicked as a thick plume of black smoke blacked out the 
sun.133 A lack of chemical disaster preparation left the public unprepared, 
and media sources did not have the information they needed to warn the 
public or publicize appropriate precautions.134 These types of failures 
demonstrate the ways that EPCRA and the RMP program fail to adequately 
prepare the public for chemical disasters. As one of its last acts, the Obama 
EPA took measures to close some of these chemical disaster preparedness 
gaps in the RMP.135 The new rules would have strengthened incidence 
reporting,136 expanded disaster planning,137 required third-party audits,138 
imposed more stringent hazard definitions,139 and improved transparency.140 
Unfortunately, the Trump administration suspended these measures,141 
probably indefinitely, at the behest of chemical manufacturers.142 
 
 130. Anndee Hochman, Union Carbide Has Leak at 2nd Plant, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 
1985), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/08/14/union-carbide-has-leak-
at-2nd-plant/386a6c54-f2d4-4b23-928e-84f0f50a4fbb/?noredirect=on&utm_term=. 
96fd334b733a. 
 131. In the Arkema explosion, the plant submitted a risk management plan containing 
worst-case scenarios, but the plan did not account for the events that occurred on August 31, 
2017, in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. Emma Platoff, As Lawsuits Over Texas Chemical 
Disaster Add Up, Advocates Blame Arkema and Rules Regulating It, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/03/30/arkema-disaster-harvey-
regulations-texas-crosby/. 
 132. See generally Michael Brune, Shelter in Place, SIERRA CLUB: COMING CLEAN BLOG 
(Aug. 9, 2012) http://sierraclub.typepad.com/michaelbrune/2012/08/richmond-oil-refinery-
fire.html. 
 133. Id. 
 134. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL., supra note 21, at 22. 
 135. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595 (proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
68). 
 136. Id. at 4609. 
 137. Id. at 4608. 
 138. Id. at 4609–18. 
 139. Id. at 4696. 
 140. Id. at 4596. 
 141. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 27133 (proposed June 14, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 68) (delaying the effective date for 20 months, until February 19, 2019, to provide time to 
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Easy access to information about toxic chemical sites is especially 
important in the aftermath of hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and other natural 
disasters. In weather disasters, people are often left to make health and 
safety decisions on their own, without the ability to coordinate with 
neighbors and emergency responders when the normal routes of 
communication such as internet access and electric-powered devices fail.143 
History has shown that when people do not know about nearby chemical 
hazards, they are far more likely to be injured by chemical releases.144 Even 
as climate change increases the number and severity of severe weather 
events, local, state, and federal authorities continue to weaken EPCRA and 
RMP provisions because of concerns about unintended use and practical 
failures. The impending challenges of climate change and supercharged 
natural disasters require local, state, and federal governments to overcome 
regulatory and practical obstacles to create a better system for chemical 
hazard information access and dissemination. 
A. Regulatory Obstacles: Overreaction to the Threat of Unintended Use 
A common concern about sharing chemical risk information is that the 
information will be misused.145 Unintended use is the main rationale for 
curbing access to EPCRA and RMP chemical safety and disaster preparation 
information. There are two main types of unintended use: terrorism and 
corporate spying.146 This section will examine each of these concerns in 
turn. 
 
conduct reconsideration proceedings and to consider objections to the rule raised by affected 
industries). 
 142. Petition for Reconsideration and Stay for the Chemical Safety Advocacy Group, In 
re Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 
Clean Air Act, Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595, No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 (E.A.D. filed 
Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0766 
(follow “View document:” hyperlink). 
 143. Christina Richards, When Communications Infrastructure Fails During a Disaster, 
Disaster Recovery J. (Nov.12, 2015). For example, Superstorm Sandy knocked out 
communications across the east coast. Jim McKay, Sandy Created a Black Hole of 
Communication, Emergency Management (Jan. 28, 2013). 
 144. See, supra notes 74 & 76; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. OR2012-10821 (2012), 
https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/openrecords/50abbott/orl/2012/htm/or20121
0821.htm; see also Edgar Walters, Transcript: Abbott’s Remarks on Hazardous Chemical 
Storage, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/07/03 
/abbott-pivots-access-information-about-chemicals/. The Bhopal, Institute, and West, Texas 
chemical disasters were exacerbated by a dearth of information among plant employees, first 
responders, and citizens near the disaster sites. 
 145. Thomas C. Beierle, The Benefits and Costs of Disclosing Information About Risks: 
What Do We Know About Right To Know?, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 335, 336 (2004). 
 146. Id. 
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1.  Terrorism and National Security Risks 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there was a backlash to 
information access provisions in environmental laws, and especially those 
laws that required reports of hazardous chemical locations.147 Federal, state, 
and local governments began to doubt the prudence of supplying public 
access to information mapping out massive stores of dangerous chemicals.148 
This fear was amplified as investigators gathered evidence that terrorists 
may have relied on information downloaded from U.S. government sources 
online to plan their attacks.149 The federal government restricted access to 
federal records, tightening the language of FOIA to exempt records 
whenever there was a “sound legal basis,”150 rather than the prior more 
transparency-friendly standard of only exempting records that would cause 
“foreseeable harm.”151 This change in language marked a shift from a default 
of disclosure to one of secrecy.152 
Provisions in environmental regulations were similarly reexamined 
through a national security lens, and there was a push to restrict information 
access by excluding certain data from public records and to allow federal 
preemption of state transparency laws in certain instances.153 Legislators and 
regulators focused on EPCRA and RMP provisions as prime targets for 
restricting access. For instance, the RMP OCAs that modeled plumes of 
airborne hazardous chemicals which could endanger the health and welfare 
of more than one million people were seen as natural security risks.154 OCAs 
had originally been conceived under broad disclosure goals to maximize 
 
 147. Trang T. Tran, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and 
National Security: Restricting Public Access to Location Information of Hazardous 
Chemicals, 8 ENVTL. L. 369, 370 (2002). 
 148. Id. 
 149. O’Reilly, supra note 84, at 55960. 
 150. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB 
84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf (discussing FOIA). 
 151. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84 
/Reno%20Memo.pdf (discussing FOIA); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-
981, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2003), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-981. 
 152. A study followed agencies’ reactions to the Ashcroft FOIA memo, noting that some 
agencies adopted significant changes to their FOIA practices, amending their FOIA practices, 
and disclosing fewer records after the memo was issued. The Ashcroft Memo: “Drastic” 
Change or “More Thunder Than Lightning”?, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Mar. 14, 2003), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/findingsag.htm. 
 153. Tran, supra note 146, at 369. 
 154. Beierle, supra note 144, at 338. 
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disaster preparation and to reduce chemical hazard risk.155 However, in a 
post-9/11 world, releasing information to the entire world on how to make 
toxic plumes fan out over populous areas seemed even riskier than thwarting 
disaster preparation as people were concerned OCAs might be a treasure 
map for terrorism.156 
Even before 9/11, there were concerns about internet availability of 
worst-case scenario information.157 Responding to this concern, Congress 
passed Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory 
Relief Act (CSISSFRRA),158 a law that limited the release of OCA 
information on the Internet.159 CSISSFRRA ensured that OCAs would only 
be available in paper format in a very limited number of federal reading 
rooms, severely curtailing access to the worst-case scenario disclosures.160 
The federal government began labeling information that could assist in the 
development or use of weapons of mass destruction as classified and 
shielded information about infrastructure from disclosure.161 Information 
about industrial plant inspections, chemical production, and water supplies 
quietly disappeared from public access websites,162 as did the online RMP 
portal.163 Anything that the government feared could provide targeting 
information for terrorists hoping to use chemical plants as weapons of mass 
destruction went offline and out of access for most people. 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 339. 
 157. LINCOLN CHAFEE, FUELS REGULATORY RELIEF ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-70 (1999) 
(“Since the promulgation of the rule establishing the risk management program, the Federal 
Government has sought a means to address concerns regarding the potential terrorist threat 
posed by Internet access to off-site consequence analysis information collected under the 
RMP. Because section 112(r)(7) requires that risk management plans be available to the 
public, the EPA planned to post the information collected under this program on an Internet 
web site. Due to concerns about how terrorists might use this information if it were available 
on the Internet, the EPA revised that plan and has joined with the Department of Justice in 
seeking to limit Internet access to the off-site consequence analysis information.”). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1999). 
 159. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL SAFETY INFORMATION, SITE SECURITY AND 
FUELS REGULATORY RELIEF ACT: PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
INFORMATION (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/ 
ocafactsheet.pdf. 
 160. Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L. 
No. 10640, 113 Stat. 207 (1990). 
 161. Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to 
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), https://fas.org/sgp 
/bush/wh031902.html (discussing actions to safeguard information regarding weapons of 
mass destruction and other sensitive documents related to homeland security). 
 162. O’Reilly, supra note 84, at 569. 
 163. Beierle, supra note 144. 
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Under CSISSFRRA, anyone wanting to view an OCA must travel to a 
federal reading room.164 After presenting identification, the interested 
individual is allowed to view a hard copy of the plan.165 To further limit 
access to OCAs, the documents can neither be copied nor removed from the 
reading room sites.166 These new OCA access requirements not only make it 
harder for people to see OCAs, but they also prevent non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the media, the main conduits of chemical risk 
information, from sharing the chemical disaster information with the public. 
These OCA limitations run counter to the purpose of the RMP program 
to “inform members of the public and allow them to participate in decisions 
that affect their lives and communities.”167 Further, an open OCA disclosure 
model benefits public safety by reducing the number and severity of 
accidental chemical releases.168 In the post-9/11 RMP scheme, people 
without the time and ability to visit a reading room do not get the chemical 
hazard information they need to make informed choices. Few people sought 
out OCAs in federal reading rooms after CSISSFRRA.169 This may be 
because there are so few reading roomsmost states only have one reading 
room in the entire state. For instance, in New York, regardless of whether 
one lives in Albany, Buffalo, or Syracuse, he or she must travel to the 
reading room in Brooklyn, New York to view OCA materials.170 Because it 
is so hard to get the reports, very few news organizations or NGOs report on 
the chemical risks, and the lack of transparency reduced pressure on 
industrial plants to increase safety.171 
States made similar moves to limit access to chemical hazard materials. 
In Texas, Attorney General Abbott’s decision to restrict access to EPCRA 
Program 2 inventories in the wake of an explosion at the West Fertilizer 
Company’s storage and distribution plant in West, Texas purportedly 
stemmed from his fears about terrorism.172 Prior to this decision, Texas 
made RMP and Program 2 inventories available to homeowners, the media, 
 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1999). 
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AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/rmp/federal-reading-rooms-risk-management-plans-rmp (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
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and anyone else who wanted to know where dangerous chemicals were 
stored.173 Yet, in 2014, Abbott seized on the West Fertilizer Company 
explosion to change that policy under the guise of promoting security.174 
Never mind that the West Fertilizer Texas explosion was most likely due to 
poor safety practices at the facility and not terrorism.175 That fact did not 
stop Attorney General Abbott from using the incident to achieve 
information secrecy ends.176 Indeed, he invoked terrorism as a pretext for his 
order allowing state agencies to withhold the information “because evildoers 
could use it to gain access to the chemicals and terrorize communities.”177 
Attorney General Abbott opined that any homeowners concerned that they 
may live near stores of dangerous chemicals should “simply ask the 
companies near their homes what substances are kept on site.”178 Attorney 
General Abbott replaced a comprehensive plan for providing local 
communities access to necessary information about chemical hazards with 
something akin to a treasure hunt—tasking individual citizens with cobbling 
together their own understanding of the risks created by industrial facilities 
in their vicinity.179 
Since the 2014 decree, people seeking RMP information in Texas have 
gotten “mixed results” from asking individual companies for their Program 
2 reports.180 Although the law still requires companies to produce RMPs 
within ten days of a request, it is unclear whether the EPA enforces that 
deadline.181 Conflicting statements from EPCRA administrators about access 
 
 173. Platoff & Malewitz, supra note 15. 
 174. Texas Attorney General, supra note 143. 
 175. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives investigations ruled out 
terrorism, but questions remain about how the fire that caused the explosion started. The 
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to the explosion and its deadly aftermath. Dan Zak, After the Blast, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 
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Donations poured in and cable news crews camped for a while outside the cattle-auction 
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 176. Texas Attorney General, supra note 143. 
 177. Jay Root, Abbott: Ask Chemical Plants What’s Inside, TEX. TRIB. (July 1, 2014, 
12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/07/01/abbott-ask-chemical-plants-whats-
inside/. 
 178. Id. One Dallas news station decided to test Abbott’s proposal. They were 
unceremoniously escorted from multiple properties and received none of the information they 
requested. Editorial: Abbott Steps in It on Chemicals Issue, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 
2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2014/07/04/editorial-abbott-steps-in-
it-on-chemicals-issue. 
 179. Root, supra note 176. 
 180. Lauren McGaughy, Abbott Says Companies Must Release Chemical Info but State 
Does Not, HOUS. CHRON. (July 2, 2014, 10:13 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news 
/politics/texas/article/Abbott-says-companies-must-release-chemical-info-5596872.php. 
 181. Id. 
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to hazard information sow confusion in local offices that provide EPCRA 
records to the public. For example, even though Attorney General Abbott’s 
office eventually walked back its instructions to withhold Program 2 reports 
from the public, LEPC chairs such as Harold Lovejoy in Bexar County 
continued to withhold the records, believing that Program 2 submissions are 
confidential despite the federal law’s explicit disclosure requirements.182 
The 2000 CSSISFRA overview states: “Chemical accidents take a 
significant toll on life, property, and the environment each year. However, a 
single, successful terrorist attack on a chemical facility could take a greater 
toll than would many accidental chemical releases.”183 
Almost two decades later, the federal government should reconsider 
national security concerns and instead weigh natural disaster concerns 
against the failure to disseminate chemical hazard information to the public 
as climate change promises to bring even more punishing weather to U.S. 
localities. While national security is a legitimate rationale for withholding 
certain types of government records, the government should also recognize 
that failing to inform the public about chemical hazards can be life 
threatening, especially in extreme weather events. Restricting access to 
chemical storage data creates its own safety risks, and it can be a matter of 
life or death for citizens in a hurricane’s path.184 
2.  Safeguarding Corporate Information from Competitive Use 
Along with national security fears, people worry that industry 
competitors might take advantage of chemical data by stealing chemical 
recipes for their own corporate gain.185 Indeed, the “secret recipes” of 
chemical compositions are quite valuable, and so are details about how 
competitors run their industrial plants. That kind of information can be 
worth top dollar in competitive industrial fields, and federal, state, and local 
governments often restrict transparency provisions to protect industrial and 
commercial interests and to entice industries to develop in its jurisdiction. 
The protection of chemical information is especially pervasive in the 
hydraulic fracturing industry, where states thwart traditional transparency 
laws to protect fracking fluid formulae.186 While many states require 
fracking companies to disclose the contents of fracking fluids used in wells 
within their borders to state regulators, all states exempt proprietary 
information, or information considered by the mining companies to be 
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 183. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 158. 
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“trade secrets” from public disclosure requirements.187 Across the country, 
when fracking chemicals are labeled trade secret, information about them 
becomes unavailable to the public, including first responders and emergency 
workers.188 Some states go even further, exempting trade secret-labeled 
fracking fluids not only from public disclosure but also from disclosure to 
regulators. In Texas, Louisiana, and Colorado, the agencies charged with 
protecting human health and welfare have no idea what fracking fluids 
contain.189 Pennsylvania requires that fracking companies turn over this 
information to health professionals who request the information to treat a 
patient exposed to the chemicals.190 However, until recently, Pennsylvania 
law also required doctors using this provision to sign a confidentiality 
agreement that prevented any disclosure of the information—even to the 
exposed patient.191 After years of litigation,192 a plurality of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court finally found those confidentiality agreements 
unconstitutional, along with many other secrecy provisions in 
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Law.193 
While protecting proprietary information is important, the industry has 
used trade secret claims to avoid disclosing vital public health information. 
There is ample evidence that fracking fluids are contaminating drinking 
water.194 This contamination creates an urgent public need to know the 
composition of those fluids. The industry should not have the power to deny 
access to that information under the guise of trade secrets. 
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 188. Id. at 411–16. 
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B. Political and Practical Obstacles to Information Access 
Beyond regulatory barriers designed to prevent unintended use, 
procedural obstacles also make chemical data inaccessible. One major 
practical issue is administrative failure to update information access laws.195 
The RMP needs some information access improvements.196 Even after the 
RMP’s implementation, regulated entities were the site of more than 1,500 
reportable accidents, and approximately 500 of those accidents had off-site 
impacts. RMP facility accidents have killed 60 people, injured 
approximately 17,000 more, and forced evacuations or shelter-in-place 
orders affecting approximately 500,000 others and costing more than $2 
billion.197 
After the West Fertilizer Company explosion in 2016, President Obama 
issued an Executive Order to improve the RMP.198 The Order sought to 
improve operational coordination with states, tribes, and local partners, to 
enhance agency coordination and information sharing, to modernize policies 
and guidance, and to identify best practices for preventing chemical release 
disasters.199 The EPA proposed changes to the RMP rule in 2016,200 and it 
published a final rule on January 13, 2017, mere days before the Trump 
administration entered their executive offices.201 The new rule would have 
modernized and improved the RMP program, requiring additional 
information collection and increasing access to chemical hazard 
information.202 Before any of these improvements to the RMP were 
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implemented, the new administration withdrew the final rule203 in response 
to a petition filed by the so-called “RMP Coalition,” a group of industry 
corporations including the American Petroleum Institute and the American 
Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers.204 Ironically, the petitioners that 
killed the new RMP rule included both the state of Texas205 and Arkema.206 
Lax enforcement also prevents public access to accurate disaster 
preparation information. For example, companies cut and paste information 
from one reporting form into other forms, without regard to relevance.207 
These companies are banking on regulators not reading the documents—
converting a substantive process into merely a series of hoops to jump 
through.208 The most famous such example was BP’s oil spill response plan 
for the drilling operation in the Gulf of Mexico.209 After the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster dumped more than 200 million gallons of crude oil into the 
Gulf of Mexico, it became clear that BP’s spill action plan was chock full of 
data it had copied and pasted from a plan designed for another project.210 For 
example, BP’s Gulf of Mexico planning form listed walruses, sea otters, sea 
lions and seals as the “sensitive biological resources” at risk in the event of 
an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, even though none of those animals live in 
the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem.211 Despite this obvious misinformation, the 
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plan was approved and was the only resource available to the public and 
first responders as a reliable source of emergency response information.212 
EPCRA and RMP rules are also under-enforced by SERCs and LEPCs. 
These state and local entities often lack the resources and staff to monitor 
industry reporting practices or file lawsuits when regulated entities fail to 
properly report their data.213 SERC and LEPC programs lack uniformity as 
each state and locality has its own financial and staffing limitations.214 The 
limitations of local enforcement are clear: on a local level, studies show that 
LEPCs often fail to provide public notice about their activities and meetings, 
and they do not receive public inquiries, as most of the public does not even 
know that LEPCs exist.215 There is often little or no LEPC oversight, as 
LEPC compliance is usually enforced through citizen suits, placing the onus 
on monitoring and ensuring public access to chemical data on the public 
itself.216 The citizen suit model for ensuring that LEPCs are doing their jobs 
is especially ineffective in natural disasters, where weather forecasts do not 
give people facing catastrophic weather enough time for filing lawsuits to 
get data from LEPCs. 
Even when an LEPC is operating at its best, chemical hazard data is 
difficult to access. For one, LEPCs provide paper records in physical 
reading rooms, with little or no online availability.217 Reading rooms can 
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often only be visited by appointment, during business hours.218 Although 
Program 2 EPCRA inventories must be provided to LEPCs within ten days 
of a formal request, there are no clear penalties for companies that refuse 
these requests.219 While delayed access to information may be less of an 
issue for general awareness in low-danger situations, such an approach is 
wholly insufficient for preparing people who are facing natural disasters. 
State and local recordkeeping are also inefficient, because data centers 
similar to LEPCs are under-resourced. Even the federal government is 
stretched thin in managing large information collections.220 States and 
localities, with significantly fewer resources, struggle to maintain the 
necessary records.221 Further, state agency recordkeeping practices tend to 
be rather slipshod. State environmental records are often incomplete, and 
when states reorganize their files, people may no longer be able to access 
them.222 Lack of staff, technology, and funding can leave LEPCs with little 
ability to create a truly accessible collection of records, and in 2019, online 
access remains a distant hope.223 Instead, of easily accessible digital formats, 
paper copies of information are stored on dusty filing shelves.224 Even states 
that manage to publish chemical hazard data online cannot afford high-
quality database systems. For example, Massachusetts and New Jersey 
adopted online systems that made it hard for people to use the underlying 
data.225 
Finally, chemical hazard information is often difficult for laypersons to 
understand. Most first responders and community members are not chemists 
or science experts, so the jargon and formulae of chemical hazard reports are 
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difficult to interpret.226 EPCRA’s TRI can seem like an impenetrable data 
dump to a layperson. Similarly, RMP plans need to be interpreted by science 
experts. In the short span of time between natural disaster warnings and 
natural disasters striking, first responders and the public need informational 
materials that are streamlined and easy to digest.227
 
For this reason, we 
propose a new framework for risk disclosure, one based on a model that has 
already been proven effective in another contextFDA’s product labeling 
system. 
V. ADAPTING FDA’S FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSMITTING RISK INFORMATION 
The FDA’s successful methods for explaining and communicating 
about risks to the public can inform solutions to problems with chemical 
hazard information access. Effective disaster preparation and reaction 
usually requires quick thinking and streamlined processes. People must 
know three basic things: (1) whether there is a danger, (2) what the danger 
is, and (3) how best to prepare for it. Is there a chance that a nearby plant 
will release a toxic plume into the air? Is the plume going to be filled with 
toxins that will hurt people’s throats or eyes? Is there a danger that the 
emission may ignite or cause an explosion? These types of information 
should be clearly and efficiently communicated to people at risk. 
The FDA has successfully employed an effective risk communication 
system, providing plain language circulars and messages to consumers about 
medication risks.228 The FDA’s solution for transmitting risk information to 
the public can be found in labeling laws and FDA regulations.229 Our 
proposed model offers a simple, accessible way to reach the public, and it 
preserves the balance of providing information access while safeguarding 
information from unintended uses. 
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FDA labeling and packaging provides just enough accurate information 
to help people make sound choices.230 The labeling laws require package 
inserts, direction circulars, and package circulars that list potential risks and 
side effects.231 The laws provide relevant warnings, specifying what could 
occur when using the medication and what to do when a negative side effect 
occurs.232 These labeling requirements are designed not for consumers, but 
to help healthcare practitioners easily find, read, and convey information 
important for the safe and effective use of prescription drugs.233 The result, 
however, is more useful, easy to understand information for both consumers 
and professionals. 
The information in FDA circulars need not be complex nor technical, 
in fact, streamlined summaries highlight the important details necessary to 
ensure that healthcare professionals and the public understand drug risks.234 
The disclosures necessary for effective natural disaster safety are not in-
depth or technical. They need not reveal information at the heart of the 
unintended use concerns; people do not need to know precise trade secret 
chemical “recipes,” nor do they need the precise address or location 
descriptors directing people to the chemicals themselves. Rather, citizens 
simply need to know what the risks are and whether they are in a location 
that is at risk. 
Streamlined, plain language communication would help people prepare 
for chemical disasters. In fact, EPCRA already requires facilities to submit 
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard required material safety data sheets 
(MSDS), which are similar to FDA circulars, to SERCs, LEPCs, and local 
fire departments.235 MSDS provide data on the health and physical hazards 
of chemicals and list protective measures.236 Adopting an FDA model could 
help disseminate the information in the MSDS beyond workplaces, to the 
public, in an efficient, easy-to-access manner. 
Further, experience shows that local laws providing chemical disaster 
information to the public do not inevitably create a slippery slope to 
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unintended use.237 Some state laws provide limited chemical information to 
promote safe mining and community preparedness in case of a chemical 
disaster. For example, in Louisiana, fracking companies must identify the 
trade name and supplier of fracking fluid additives, as well as the function 
or purpose of the fluid “such as acid, biocide, breaker, corrosion inhibitor” 
without providing the specific formulae for fracking fluids.238 There are 
ways to balance the benefits of disclosure with the risks of unintended use 
by providing “information that is of little use to those seeking to do harm 
while at the same time useful to a public concerned about risks.”239 One 
benefit of narrower disclosure is that these less-specific chemical disclosures 
simplify disclosure for regulated entities, making disclosure less 
burdensome.240 
FDA-styled disclosures would certainly have helped the community 
surrounding the Arkema plant. If Arkema had disseminated circulars letting 
people know that its plant contained chemicals that would combust if the 
refrigeration system failed, and had supplied information about how to 
prevent injuries from chemical plumes, then first responders would have 
been adequately prepared for the risks. Because no such requirements 
existed, Arkema’s CEO refused to describe the substances that would be 
released when the plant exploded, leaving one exasperated reporter to write, 
“[t]hey could be hoarding nerve gas in that place, and be perfectly within the 
law not to tell anybody about it.”241 This level of corporate secrecy thwarts 
the “community right to know” enshrined in federal law and makes 
comprehensive emergency planning impossible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Climate change makes natural disasters more likely and more intense. 
New weather trends require communities to be ready for chemical disasters 
caused by flood waters, high winds, fires, mudslides, and other weather 
events. The information access infrastructure is critical for effective disaster 
response and hazard management. Disaster response collaboration is an 
unpredictable, dynamic, and complex interplay between multiple groups of 
professionals and stakeholders in the best of cases.242 Arming the public and 
first responders with information about potential chemical hazards will 
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improve disaster response communication and organization. If first 
responders know that an industrial plant is likely to explode, they can plan 
for the explosion and its risks, and even try to prevent it. Instead, the 
Arkema first responders find themselves suing to recover for the injuries 
they suffered because the plant failed to disclose chemical data.243 
Optimal risk communication requires broad information disclosure to 
people directly impacted by risk, and also to NGOs and media that may 
communicate the risk to communities.244 State officials, including Greg 
Abbott, whose information infrastructure plans center around driving around 
and asking facilities “whether or not they have chemicals”245 fail to keep the 
public safe in natural disaster situations. As extreme weather increases, 
proactive, streamlined, and wide-ranging information distribution is 
necessary to ensure that first responders and communities are prepared for 
potential chemical disasters. Adopting the FDA’s disclosure model will 
achieve both of those goals: improving emergency response and arming the 
public with the knowledge they need to take appropriate precautions in the 
face of this growing threat. 
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